Tough talk but soft conditions?  CEPS Commentary, 16 March 2011 by Gros, Daniel.
 
 
Daniel Gros is Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This Commentary was 
previously published in a shorter version on VoxEU.com, 14 March 2011. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. The views 
expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is 
associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2011 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 ▪ http://www.ceps.eu 
Tough talk but soft conditions? 
Daniel Gros 
16 March 2011 
At the European Council on 11 March 2011, EU 
leaders agreed to the outlines of a new mechanism to 
deal with eurozone debt problems after the current 
mechanism expires in 2013. The mechanism is a 
continuation in the leaders’ preference for ‘tough talk 
and soft conditions’. This column argues that the 
package is merely the next step down the slippery slope 
of EU taxpayers sharing the burden with Greek 
taxpayers. 
he main focus of the extraordinary meeting 
of EU leaders of March 11 was Libya – not 
the eurozone debt and banking problems1 – 
but after this main topic had been dealt with, an 
informal agreement was reached on the eurozone 
debt issue. That agreement reaffirms a tendency 
that can be summarized as follows: 
 “No default will ever be allowed, but all bailouts 
will be preceded by tough talk.” 
This general direction has now been clearly set. It 
will take a major disruption to make the EU 
convoy change track. 
What has been agreed? More money at 
cheaper rates 
The tough talk was the agreement on the 
renamed “Pact for the euro”, which contains a list 
                                                            
1 See “Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy President of 
the European Council at the press conference 
following the Informal Summit of the Heads of State 
and Government of the Eurozone” and  Conclusions 
of the heads of state or government of the Euro Area, 
11 March 2011. 
of desirable policy goals (national fiscal rules, 
more competitiveness, reform of retirement 
systems) but no means to implement them. 
The soft conditions came in the form of: 
•  Restructuring the official debt of Greece for 
which the maturity was extended to 7.5years 
and the interest rate reduced to 4.2% and 
•  Increasing the funding capability of the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) to 
the €440 billion originally foreseen (through an 
increase in the guarantees given by the AAA-
rated countries, especially Germany). 
These parts of the deal might be summarised as 
“more money at cheaper rates”. 
Apparently it was also agreed that the EFSF 
might not only provide credits to countries that 
have lost access to the markets, but that it could 
also directly buy the government bonds of these 
countries. It is difficult to see the difference 
between primary market purchases of 
government bonds and providing credit directly 
to a country. This part of the agreement will be of 
limited value unless the condition (EFSF 
programme) is relaxed, as it well might be in 
future. 
The trend: Tough talk and soft conditions 
The meeting marks the third time that Germany 
has talked tough but then caved in when financial 
markets became nervous. The really tough talk 
that initiated the latest round of market 
nervousness came late in 2010, in the form of an 
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agreement between France and Germany. This 
agreement was then enshrined in the Conclusions 
of the European Council of 28-29 October, 
stipulating: 
1.  Financial support from the European 
Stability Mechanism will be subordinated to 
a prior ‘sustainability test’. 
2.  New bond issues should carry ‘collective 
action clauses’ (CACs) which render it 
easier to negotiate a restructuring or 
rescheduling, should this become necessary. 
This sounded tough, but it has now become clear 
that the ‘sustainability test’ will remain a paper 
tiger. 
The litmus test of any such test will be Greece. 
Most independent observers and investors 
assume that the public debt of Greece today is not 
sustainable. However, the official story is 
completely different. The IMF/EU/ECB mission 
has already published its own assessment with a 
clear conclusion – there is no problem of 
sustainability. 
This optimistic stance of the IMF/EU/ECB troika 
is not surprising. These institutions could not 
have started the rescue programme if they had 
not come to this conclusion. 
Even apart from the specifics of the Greek case, it 
is clear that any rescue programme will be 
structured in such a way that it yields a 
sustainable path for public finances. To change 
the judgment that the public finances of the 
country in question are not sustainable after all 
would constitute an admission of defeat or, 
worse, the admission of an error in judgment. No 
official institution will ever admit this. 
Even if the Greek programme goes off track, the 
official reaction will have to be: “There have been 
temporary problems, but a new programme will 
bring public finances back to a sustainable path”. 
Basis of the sustainability calculation 
In Greece’s case, the sustainability calculations of 
the IMF/EU/ECB are based on three simple 
assumptions: 2 
                                                            
2 A ‘primary’ budget surplus (i.e. not including 
interest payments on the debt) runs down the 
debt/GDP numerator, GDP growth runs up the 
denominator and interest payments run up the 
1.  The country can sustain a primary fiscal 
surplus of 5.5 % of GDP indefinitely,
3 
2.  The growth rate of nominal GDP will be on 
average at least 3.5% and 
3.  The interest rate is at most 5.5%. 
Under these combined projections, the critical 
debt/GDP ratio will start to decline around 2013. 
Problems with the sustainability calculation 
But there are three problems with this rosy 
calculation. 
1.  Most observers would of course doubt that 
the Greek body politic can sustain 
indefinitely a primary surplus of 5.5% of 
GDP. But this is what the Greek government 
promises; the Troika’s sustainability 
assessment thus accepts it as an assumption.4 
2.  Similar doubts apply to the interest rate 
assumption (at most 5.5 % ) .  I t  i s  h i g h l y  
unlikely that private investors will buy bonds 
carrying such an interest rate. 
The key issue here is a bit technical. According to 
the leaders’ informal agreement, new bonds 
issued after 2013 would contain collective action 
clauses. These CACs are baked-in contractual 
conditions that make rescheduling easier. Since 
‘rescheduling’ means ‘partial default’ from the 
investors’ perspective, CACs are worrying to 
private investors – even more so since about half 
of Greek public debt is ‘official’ (i.e. own by the 
troika) and all of this will be senior to private 
debt.5 In plain English, this means that official 
debt-holders get to jump to the head of the re-
                                                                                                   
numerator. Sustainability means that the debt/GDP 
ratio doesn’t grow forever. 
3 Greece went through a significant fiscal adjustment 
during the early 1990s and recorded a positive 
primary balance between 1994 and 2003. Yet in terms 
of magnitude, the largest surplus reached only 4.3% 
and it stayed above 4% for only four years (see Cinzia 
Alcidi and Daniel Gros, “The  European experience 
with large fiscal adjustments, 28 April 2010 
(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4949). 
4 Note that in 2010 Greece paid about €14 billion in 
interest on its debt, which corresponds to about 6% of 
Greek GDP.  
5 See Daniel Gros (2010), “The seniority conundrum: 
Bail out countries but bail in private, short-term 
creditors?”, 10 December 2010 
(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5891). TOUGH TALK BUT SOFT CONDITIONS? | 3 
 
payment queue if things go wrong. Private 
investors who think all this through – and who do 
not share the Troika’s faith in the three 
assumptions – will demand an interest rate that 
compensates them for the probability of 
rescheduling losses. 
3.  The agreed size of the post-2013 Greek 
programme may well have to increase until 
almost all Greek public debt will have been 
refinanced by the ESM. 
Given that the interest charge on the existing €110 
billion programme for Greece (based for now on 
bilateral credits, but later to be rolled into the new 
facility to be called the European Stability 
Mechanism, ESM) has been lowered to below 
5.5%, the interest assumption has also received 
official approval. And based on the logic 
discussed above, private investors will shy away 
from Greek debt and the ESM will have to take 
up the slack. 
It is thus likely that the size of the Greek 
programme will have to be increased post-2013. 
Since Greek public debt already amounts to over 
€300 billion, the size of the ESM will have to 
increase after 2013, as the Greek package alone is 
likely to require about 60% of its financing 
capacity. 
But this is not the end of the problems. 
Once most Greek public debt has become official 
debt, a whole new game starts. At this point 
restructuring of private debt is no longer an 
option – the private lenders will have already 
backed out. The collective action clauses that were 
so cleverly included will be irrelevant. From this 
point onwards, the ESM can only restructure its 
own claims on Greece. 
Restructuring in this situation would mean 
European taxpayers taking the hit in terms of 
longer maturities and lower rates. At that point, 
expect more of the same, i.e. tough talk and soft 
conditions. 
Conclusion 
On March 11th, the European Council has once 
more decided to kick the can down the road. They 
failed to think through the consequences of their 
actions from the perspective of the markets and 
they failed to think through what their decision 
will mean for the options they will face in the 
future. 
Having come this far, it becomes very difficult to 
change direction. The best our leaders can hope 
for is that the road will take a decisive turn for the 
better and that the new ‘Pact for the euro’ helps 
them avoid future accidents. 
 